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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
DIVORCE-FiNALITY Or ALIMONY DEcREE.-In the recent case
of Burdette v. Burdette, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, of- its own accord, made a reservation in the
decree of divorce from bed and board, providing for a
change of the allowance for alimony, if the changed future cir-
cumstances of the parties should warrant it, stating that without
such reservation the decree is res judicata. The court cites as
authority for such statement the West Virginia case of Cariens v.
Cariens'. That case supports the court's conclusion, and West Vir-
ginia in adopting such rule is supported by some authority.
Courts upholding this view base their decisions upon the ground
that divorce was not known at common law and is of statutory
creation, and jurisdiction is determined entirely by the statute'.
The weight of authority, however, adopts the view that while
jurisdiction over divorce from bed and board is obtained by
statute, the court is to act in such matter in accordance with the
rules of the ecclesiastical courts.' It was early determined in
Parliament and by the courts of England that the ecclesiastical
law is part of the law of the land and is sometimes denominated a
branch of the common law.' The courts of this country adopting
the majority view recognize the ecclesiastical law as part of the
common law and interpret the statute to mean that what was
formerly the function of the ecclesiastical court shall now be the
function of the chancellor, and the existing rules of law upon the
subject shall be followed unless changed by statute.:
Divorce from bed and board was the only form of divorce grant-
153 S. E. 1 0 (1930).
50 W. Va. 113, 40 S. E. 335 (1901).
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 146 Ga. 382, 91 S. E. 977 (1917). See Parsons v.
Parsons, 9 N. H. 309, 319 (1838); Peugnat v. Phelps, 48 Barb. 566 (N. Y.
1867).
'Cariens v. Cariens, supra. n. 2; see Bnrtis v. Burtis, 2 N. Y. Oh. Rep. 522,
525 (1825).
Bursler v. Bursler, 5 Pick. 427 (Mass. 1827); Lockridge v. Lockridge,
2 B. M n. 258 (Ky. 1842); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 18 Il. 39 (1857); Taylor
v. Taylor, 93 N. C. 418 (1885); 1 BISHOP MARRhIAGE AlD Div. (5th ed.
1873) 57, § 71.
'Catteral v. Catteral, 1 Rob. Ece. 580 (1847); 1 BISHOP MARRIAGE AvD
Div. (5th ed. 1873) 45, § 58; 1 Harg. Law Tracts (1787) 445 and note.7Supra n. 5. See Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 54, 165 Pac. 1063, 1065 (1917).
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ed at ecclesiastical law8, and the decree for alimony was subject
to change from time to time. if the changed circumstances of the
parties should warrant it.!
The nature of alimony would seem to support an interpreta-
tion of the statute in accord with the general weight of authority.
After the decree of divorce from bed and board, the parties are
still husband and wife, with all the duties and obligations of each
to the othere, and the court in its decree for alimony undertakes
to state the extent of the duty of financial support of one spouse
to the other. Such decree is based uipon the present social and
financial situations of the parties.' But these situations are
subject to change, frequently a very remarkable change, and it is
obvious that in such case the extent of the obligation of support
has changed and the decree, if final, is erroneous. Since the
rule of the minority would, when the circumstances of the parties
change, operate to defeat the purpose of alimony, and the rule
of the majority would operate to fulfill the purpose of the alimony
decree, it would seem to be the better rule.
'In the case of an absolute divorce, the decree for alimony is generally re-
garded as final. The reasons generally assigned are, first, that absolute
divorce did not exist at ecclesiastical law and the statute governs and second,
the obligation arises not from the marriage relation, but wholly from the
decree, because the relation between the parties has ceased, and the
decree is final. Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 613 N. E. 123 (1903);
Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063 (1917); see Spain v. Spain, 177
Iowa 249, 251, 158 N. W. 529, 530 (1916).
It is true the marriage status has ceased, but the duty of support has con-
tinued by reason of the decree. Andrew v. Andrew, 62 Vt. 495, 20 Atl. 819(1890); Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898). The decree is
simply a means of compelling "the husband to fulfill his martial obliga-
tions--viz., support his wife,--although the material bund has been served."
Field v. Field, 15 Abb. N. C. 434, 435 (N. Y. 1885). The conditions out of
which the obligation arises are subject to change to the same extent as if
the martial bond had not been severed.
The legislature has not seen fit to make any distinction in the classes
of divorce with respect to alimony, and it seems strange why the court in
granting the same hind of alimony in one case as in the other, should losejurisdiction as to one and not as to the other. It would seem that the rules
of the ecclesiastical courts with regard to alimony should, by interpretation, be
incorporated in the statute.
' Note (1854) 60 Am. Dec. 667; see Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D.
C. 334, 344 (1899); Ruge v. Ruge, supra n. 7.
"Freeman v. Belfar, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486 (1917).
u Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N. Y. 212 (1874); Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182
(1884).
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The injustice of the rule in Cariens v. (ariens, supra, will term-
inate in West Virginia probably without the necessity of the court
reversing itself. Under the code of West Virginia", which takes
effect January 1, 1931, the state has fallen in line with a great
number of the states, and has by statute given the court power to
revise the decree for alimony, whether for divorce from bed and
board or absolute divorce, "as the altered circumstances or needs
of the parties may render necessary to meet the ends of justice".
-JOHN HAmPTON HoGm
EASEMENTS OF NECESSrY-INCREASING THE SERWTuE.-It ap-
peared in a recent decision that one of the defendants had an
easement of necessity from his 95-acre tract across the plaintiff's
land to a nearby road and became owner of an adjoining tract
of 31 acres. He sold the timber on the 31-acre tract to the other
defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff an injunction to
restrain the transportation of this timber across his land. On
appeal, reversed. Held, that an owner having an easement of
necessity as to one tract of land, cannot as a matter of right ex.
tend such easement to other lands he may subsequently acquire.
Dorsey v. Dorsey.'
The Court followed the old English case, Howell v. King,* hold-
ing that one having a right of way to Blackacre over the land of
another has no right to drive his cattle to land beyond Blackaere.
The doctrine that a way to a tract of land cannot be used as a
way to additional land adjoining is settled in West Virginia.'
The Ohio case of Remington v. Fireproof Warelwuse: Company,"
suggests a variation. The right of way was extended to the use of a
subsequently-purchased 10-foot strip of ground and the court
held that a driveway could be used to the benefit of newly ac-
"Ch. 48, art. 2, § 15.
1153 S. E. 146 (W. Va. 1930). See generally JONES ON EASEMENTS (1898)§ 360.
21 Mod. 190 (1674).
3 Shaver v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664 (1900) ; McNeil v. Kennedy,
88 W. Va. 524, 107 S. E. 203 (1920); Bennett v. Booth, 70 W. Va. 264, 73
S. E. 909, (1912); see Springer v. McIntyre, 9 W. Va. 196 (1876); Powell
v. Simms, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871); Standiford v. Goudy, 6 W. Va. 364 (1873).
' 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 301, 87 Ohio St. 523 (aff'd).
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